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Abstract 
This paper examines the use of asymmetric tariffs as a regulatory instrument. A 
monopoly setup is adopted in which the firm sells in two markets but price controls are 
introduced in just one. The regulator’s objective is to increase consumer welfare 
through this price discriminatory practice, with the firm operating under a profit 
constraint. We consider cases where consumer welfare in the two markets is weighted 
both equally and unequally and also cases where the cost of supplying the two retail 
markets is determined in a monopsonistic input market. The results suggest that in 
certain situations controlling prices in only one market could be a desirable option from 
a welfare perspective. 
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1. Motivation  
 
In the 1980s and 90s the UK energy market was subject to radical deregulation and 
restructuring. However, subsequent attempts to internalise environmental costs and 
capital market reconfiguration have led to higher prices, a focus on energy company 
profits and a continuing concern over affordability (Department for Business, Energy 
and Industrial Strategy, 2017). Questions regarding the optimal extent and nature of 
energy markets regulation are politically salient because of the degree of monopoly 
power suppliers enjoy whilst delivering a commodity considered by consumers and 
policy makers as a necessity (Joskow, 2005; Joskow and Tirole, 2000, 2006). The 
trilemma of simultaneously achieving security of supply, affordability and 
environmental aims poses particular problems (Ang et al., 2015).1 
 
In early August Ofgem (2016), Britain’s energy regulator, announced proposals to 
introduce a price cap in just one segment of the market. This was for households using 
prepayment meters, generally the most vulnerable consumers. Price caps are widely 
used instruments of regulation (Braeutigam and Panzar, 1993; Brown et al., 2017; 
Cowan, 2002; Dobbs, 2004; Parker, 1997; Simshauser, 2014) and these proposals have 
become part of the active debate on the operation of the UK electricity market. They 
have subsequently been implemented for a subset of customers (Ofgem, 2017). 
 
The present paper models, in a stylised way, the imposition of a price tariff that covers 
just one segment of the whole market and uses as an example the energy market. The 
aim is to identify the likely welfare implications of implementing such a policy. Whilst 
the focus is on energy, this analysis has wider application as selective price controls are 
adopted in other markets to restrict monopoly power and to affect desirable 
distributional impacts. For example, in the UK 45% of rail fares are currently capped 
                                                          
1 In some cases energy policy also becomes an element of industrial policy. For example, the Scottish 
Government (2015) identifies energy as one of its growth sectors. 
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(Butcher, 2017), the fees charged in English Universities for undergraduate study is 
capped, whilst post-graduate fees are not and property companies are also often 
required to provide a certain proportion of dwellings at controlled (affordable) prices 
as part of planning permission for larger property developments. Whilst this form of 
symmetric price regulation is common, its practical effectiveness and accuracy in 
targeting policy support has been questioned (Simshauser, 2014; Simshauser and 
Nelson, 2014; Simshauser and Whish-Wilson, 2017).  
 
We investigate this partial application of price controls in a model in which a 
monopolistic/monopsonistic firm purchases in a unified wholesale market and sells in 
two retail markets. We focus on the outcomes when one of the retail markets operates 
under price controls, whereas the other faces no regulation. A key constraint is that the 
firm bears an obligation to meet the market demand in the controlled market, meaning 
that quantity rationing is not experienced in that market. 2  By implementing this 
asymmetric price control, the regulator effectively imposes price discrimination in the 
energy retail market which results in indirect income redistribution, facilitated by cross-
subsidization between the markets. The analysis proceeds using both algebraic and, 
more especially, geometric methods.  
 
An important element of the model is that the two markets are not only served by the 
one firm but they are also potentially inter-connected through their input prices. This is 
because the output sold to each retail market is supplied using an input purchased in a 
common wholesale market. Where the wholesale price is an increasing function of 
output, the two retail markets are interrelated, in that higher levels of activity in one 
increase costs for the other. Whilst the model uses linear demand and cost functions, it 
has generality in that it does not otherwise impose specific, or restricted sets of, 
parameter values.  
 
                                                          
2 The requirement that the firm must meet demand at the tariff means that the regulator effectively 
simultaneously sets both price and the output level in any market in which a tariff is set.  
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In this asymmetric regulatory approach, the tariff is only introduced in one segment of 
the market. But if differential prices are appropriate, then imposing differential tariffs 
would seem the optimal solution.3 However, we are arguing that constraints on the 
operation of the regulator could make the imposition of price controls in only part of 
the market a more realistic and sensible option. First, the government might want to 
retain unrestrained market activity in part of the market for practical or ideological 
reasons. Second, the government might not have enough political capital to introduce 
differential tariffs in all sections of the market, especially if this involves explicit cross-
subsidisation. These restrictions could constrain the regulator either to impose equal 
treatment in all sections of the market or introduce regulation in only one section. The 
welfare implications of these two options are compared in this paper.  
 
The paper presents results which are generally favourable to the imposition of such 
tariffs. However, it is important to sound a note of caution. To begin, for analytical 
clarity the model we adopt is extremely stripped down and sparse. We therefore do not 
deal with the practical problems of introducing, implementing and monitoring the 
policy (Brown et al., 2017). For example, it is important to be able to separate the 
markets in an efficient manner, plus there is the question of whether subsidising fuel 
use is the most effective way of dealing with the difficulties faced by low income 
households (Felder 2010; Simshauser and Nelson 2014). There is a risk of producing a 
new batch of fuel poor household not captured and gifted with first round benefits. Also 
energy policy attempts to achieve a number of goals and in the UK is accompanied by 
extensive legislation and regulation. In this paper we focus solely on the potential 
interaction between two issues: the control of market power and affordability. We 
implicitly treat the instruments to achieve other goals of energy policy, and also other 
elements of government policy in general, as constraints. 
 
                                                          
3 The welfare and competition arguments concerning the control of 3rd degree price discrimination are 
outlined in Armstrong (2008) and Stole (2007). Under certain circumstances allowing 3rd degree profit 
maximising price discrimination can be welfare enhancing. However, the discussion here involves a 
slightly different situation where the regulator is imposing a specific form of price control.  
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Further we do not deal with issues surrounding imperfect information and strategic 
interaction. In regulating utilities in general, and energy markets in particular, the 
impact that the decisions of the regulated firms has on the market depends on the 
regulatory setup and on the way in which the market responds to price incentives (Hviid 
and Waddams Price, 2012; Waddams Price, 2005). This has implications for actual or 
potential competition. For example, there has been extensive discussion of the difficulty 
involved in determining the appropriate treatment of third degree price discrimination 
in the regulation literature (Armstrong, 2008; Stole, 2007). In the UK this applies 
particularly to attempts to eliminate geographic price discrimination (Hviid and 
Waddams Price, 2012).4 Kennedy (1994) and Ulph (1996) address the strategic effects 
of environmental regulation in a different context to the present paper and for the 
regulation of the UK energy market in general, the work of Littlechild (2014, 2016 and 
2017) is particularly relevant. 
 
Section 2 outlines the basic model. As in the rest of the paper, this consists of a 
monopolist/monopsonist that purchases electricity in the unified wholesale market and 
sells in two identical retail sectors. In the basic case separate tariffs in the two retail 
markets are introduced. Section 3 describes the construction of the iso-welfare and iso-
profit functions. Section 4 analyses the welfare-maximizing operation of tariffs under 
the most straightforward conditions. This is where we impose a zero profit constraint, 
constant wholesale prices and equal welfare weights between retail markets. Section 5 
introduces differential welfare weights. Section 6 extends the analysis to investigate the 
impact of restricting the intervention to imposing a tariff in only one of the retail 
markets. Section 7 shows the effect of introducing a positive profit constraint. In 
Section 8 the assumption of a constant wholesale price is relaxed and Section 9 is a 
short conclusion.  
 
 
 
                                                          
4 We plan to do work in the future explicitly on the impact of price controls on new entry. 
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2. The basic model  
 
We begin by establishing notation and a number of simplifying assumptions. This will 
allow the construction in Section 3 of iso-profit and iso-welfare functions, which link 
combinations of tariffs in markets 1 and 2 to given levels of total profit and consumer 
welfare respectively. These prove to be effective devices for analyzing the options for 
the regulator. 
 
A monopoly electricity supplier faces two identical retail markets, each characterized 
by a linear inverse demand function: 
(1)     1,2i ip a bq i    
where pi and qi are the prices and quantities in market i, and a and b are parameters 
which take positive values that do not vary across the two markets.5 The value taken by 
the parameter a is the maximum price that the monopolist can charge in either market 
and have non-negative sales in that market. Therefore in all the analysis the tariff is 
never set above a.6 The parameter b is the (negative) slope of the inverse demand curve. 
The firm’s total cost, CT, is made up of a fixed cost, Γ, and the cost of purchasing 
electricity in the wholesale market, in which it acts as a monopsonist. The wholesale 
price of electricity,
Wp , is again assumed to be a linear function of total electricity 
supply, 
Tq  . This implies:   
(2)     
T W TC p q   
where 
(3)     
W Tp c dq   
and 
                                                          
5 The basic equations for an analysis where the demand parameters for individual retail markets vary 
are given in Appendix B. 
6 Of course, the politically-feasible maximum price cap is likely to be lower.  
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(4)     1 2T i
i
q q q q    
Again c and d are parameters which take non-negative values; c is the minimum price 
in the wholesale market that would generate a non-negative supply and d is the slope 
of the wholesale electricity supply curve. Therefore where d is zero, there is a constant 
wholesale price for electricity equal to c. The general expression for total profits for the 
company, ΠT, takes the form 
(5)   
T i i W T
i
p q p q   
 
 
The unconstrained profit maximizing outcome is derived in Appendix A. However, 
initially we are concerned with the options for a regulator who can discriminate and 
differentiate the tariffs,
ip , set in each of the two retail markets. In general it will prove 
useful to define all the relevant variables as functions of the two price tariffs and the 
demand and cost parameters. The aim of the regulator is identified as being to maximize 
the benefit to consumers, but conditional upon a profit constraint on the 
monopsonist/monopolist retail firm. This constraint might simply be the maintenance 
of the long-run viability of the firm, linked to the security of supply policy objective. 
On the other hand, it might be the acceptance of the political influence wielded by the 
incumbent firm.  
 
We identify the aim of the regulator as maximizing consumer benefits, later defined as 
consumer surplus, subject to a minimum profit constraint, rather than the more general 
aim of maximizing welfare for three reasons. First, we judge this to be a better 
representation of the activities of the regulator and the political constraints that they are 
likely to encounter. Second because we wish to vary the weights applied to particular 
income recipients but take as unreasonable an outcome in which negative profits would 
be the welfare maximizing outcome. Third, this very much simplifies the analysis, with 
only a small cost in terms of rigour.    
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This section simply sets up the model showing the fundamental assumptions and 
notation. In subsequent sections we analyse the properties of such a model, in particular 
the impact of intervention to cap prices in the separate retail markets.   
 
3. Iso-welfare and iso-profit functions 
 
In this section we identify the general nature of the iso-welfare and iso-profit functions 
used in this analysis. Defining the total consumer welfare,
TS , as the weighted sum of 
the consumer surplus in markets 1 and 2, for the tariff values 
1 2,p p a :  
 (6)  2
1,2 1,2
1
( )
2
T i i i i
i i
S S a p
b
 
 
     
where: 
( )
0i iT
i
a pS
p b
 
 

 
and
i is the weight put on the consumer surplus in market i. 
 
Consumer welfare is minimized, at the value zero, where 1 2,p p a . Where the 
consumers’ welfare is fixed at some positive level, TS , equation (6) can be interpreted 
as the associated iso-consumer welfare function which, for convenience, we refer to 
subsequently as the iso-welfare function. Diagrammatically, in general these functions 
take the form of segments of an ellipse which is centred on point A, with co-ordinates 
(a,a)  in 1 2,p p  space. Recall, these segments are restricted to tariff values where
1 2,p p a . In general the slope of the iso-consumer’s welfare function is given as: 
(7)   
1 2 2 2
2 1 1 1
/ ( )
/ ( )
T
T
dp S p a p
dp S p a p


   
 
  
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Broadly, the further the tariff values lie below a, the higher the level of consumer 
welfare. All the iso-welfare functions are vertical where 1p a  and horizontal where 
2p a .   
 
In order to determine the regulator’s optimal choices, we need also to identify the profit 
constraint. To calculate the monopolist/monopsonist’s profit, output in each market is 
determined by inverting equation (1), average wholesale price is given by equation (3) 
and the monopolist’s profits by equation (5), where in each case tariffs are imposed as 
the price. 
(8) 1 1 2 1 2 1 2 2
2 2
( (2 ))( ) ( (2 ))( )
T
bp bc d a p p a p bp bc d a p p a p
b b
         
    
This implies that 
(9) 
2
1 2
2 2 2
4 2 ( ) 2 2( )
, 0
( )
iT T
i i
ad bc ab d p p bp d b
p b p b
        
  
 
 
Using expression (9), the first and second order conditions imply that profits are 
maximized where both prices take the value k, where: 
(10) 1 2
4
2 4
ad bc ab
p p k
b d
 
  

 
This set of tariffs equal the unconstrained monopoly prices where there are two retail 
markets. 
 
 Iso-profit curves are the locus of values for 
1p  and 2p which produce a constant profit 
for the firm. These are implied by equation (8). In general, they take the form of an 
ellipse centered around the unconstrained profit-maximising set of market prices.  
The general slope of the iso-profit curve, is given as: 
(11) 1 2 1 2 2
2 1 1 2 1
/ 4 2 ( ) 2
/ 4 2 ( ) 2
T
T
dp p ad bc ab d p p bp
dp p ad bc ab d p p bp
      
  
      
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Where the tariffs are equal in both markets, the iso-profit curve will have a slope equal 
to -1. This reflects the symmetry in the model. The iso-profit curve is horizontal where 
1 2/dp dp = 0. From equation (11) this requires that 2/ 0T p   which occurs where 
 (12) 
1 2 24 2 ( ) 2 0.ad bc ab d p p bp        
Rearranging equation (12) identifies the value of 
2p  that produces the highest profits, 
given a tariff 
1p .  
(13) 2 1
4
2( )
ad bc ab d
p p
b d b d
 
 
 
 
Equation (13) is useful for constructing iso-profits curves. However, it also serves as a 
reaction function for the firm where only one price is capped. Replacing the tariff 2p
with the freely chosen price, 2p , equation (13) shows the profit-maximising, therefore 
freely chosen, price in market 2 where the regulator imposes a fixed tariff in market 1. 
 
Initially the no-fixed-cost zero iso-profit case is used as a benchmark. Where the 
markets are treated identically, so that the tariff imposed in both markets is the same, 
zero profits occur where:  1 2,p p a or 
2
2
bc ad
b d


. Where both tariffs equal a, there is 
zero demand, therefore zero profits. Again note that a is an effective upper bound for 
the price tariff, as higher values imply negative demand. Where the two tariffs take the 
lower value,
2
2
bc ad
b d


, which is subsequently denoted as z, the tariff is set at the 
wholesale price. Note that with identical markets the identical profit maximizing tariff 
value, k, given in equation (10), is the mean value between the two zero profit values, 
a and z. 
 
In this section therefore we have identified the generalized iso-welfare and iso-profit 
functions implied by the model set out in Section 2. In subsequent sections we introduce 
and explore the results for specific circumstances represented by the imposition of 
particular sets of parameter values.  
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4 Iso-welfare function with equal consumption weights and the zero profits 
constraint with fixed wholesale prices  
 
Figure 1: Maximum iso-welfare function with equal weights and the zero profit 
constraint with constant wholesale prices 
 
 
It is useful initially to take the special case where the wholesale price is fixed at the 
level c and is invariant to the output level, so that d = 0, and the welfare weights are 
both set equal to unity, so that
1 2 1   . This allows us to specify precisely the iso-
welfare and iso-profit curves in a tractable manner and establish some benchmark 
results. These curves are illustrated as shown in Figure 1. 
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We start with the iso-welfare function. From equation (6), if consumers in each market 
are given a weight of unity, the iso-consumer surplus curve, where the two price tariffs 
are 1p and 2p , is represented by the formula: 
(14) 
2 2
1 2
1
( ) ( )
2
TS a p a p
b
       
Expression (14) is the equation of a circle in whose center is point A, though remember 
that this representation is only valid for values of 
ip a . If R is the radius of that circle, 
equation (14) can be replaced by:  
(15) 
2
2
T
R
S
b
  
The iso-welfare functions can then be represented by a set of quarter circles in 
1 2,p p  
space whose centers are at A. WMAX is one such iso-welfare function and the further 
from A the iso-welfare function is, the higher is the consumer welfare. From equation 
(7), the slope of the function equals -1 where 1 2p p , that is to say on the 45 degree 
line through the origin. The iso-welfare curves are vertical and horizontal at their end 
points, where one of the relevant prices takes its maximum value, a. 
 
For the iso-profits curve, substituting d = 0 into equation (8) gives the total profits as: 
(16) 1 1 2 2
( )( ) ( )( )
T
p c a p p c a p
b b
   
    
Equation (16) can be reformulated as: 
(17) 
2 2 2
1 2
( )
2 2 2
T
a c a c a c
p p b
         
           
      
 
This is the equation for the iso-profit curve where profits equal T . In this specific 
case, that is where wholesale price is constant, the iso-profit curve is represented as a 
circle whose center is 
2
a c
and whose radius, r, is
2( )
2
T
a c
b

  . 
-13- 
 
 
Figure 1 shows the zero iso-profit curve Π0. Imposing equal tariffs, so that 1 2p p , the 
lowest tariff values on this curve, which we call more generally Z, is equal to (c,c). 
From equation (10) the profit maximizing tariffs are: ,
2 2
a c a c  
 
 
, and this point we 
label, again more generally as K, with co-ordinates (k,k). Given the constraint that 
output cannot take negative values, the zero iso-profit curve comprises an isolated 
point, A, and the arc BZC where at points A and Z, the tariffs in both markets take the 
value a and c respectively. In this case, the segment BZC comprises one half of a circle 
whose center is the profit maximizing tariffs ,
2 2
a c a c  
 
 
. This zero iso-profit curve 
goes through the points (c,c), (c,a) and (a,c) and from equation (17) has a radius equal 
to 
2
a c
. 
 
One key element of the analysis is the locus of tariff values where the iso-profit curves 
are horizontal or vertical. Using equation (13) and substituting d = 0 reveals that the 
tariff in markets 2 which maximizes profits, given a specific tariff in market 1 is 
2
a c
. This is at point E. This relationship is symmetric, so the iso-profit curve is vertical 
where 1
2
a c
p

 and horizontal where 2
2
a c
p

 . However, a second interpretation is 
that these points show the minimum values of each tariff that will support a given profit 
level. The minimum level of 1p is shown where the iso-profit curve is horizontal, the 
minimum level of 2p where it is vertical. 
 
Using equations (6) and (8) as the determinants of consumer surplus and profits, 
maximizing the consumer surplus, subject to a profit constraint requires: 
(18) 1 1
2 2
/ /
/ /
T T
T T
S p p
S p p
   

   
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In the symmetric case, where the consumption weights are equal, partially 
differentiating the expressions given in equations (6) and (16) for the consumer surplus 
and total profits and substituting the results into equation (18) produces the symmetrical 
outcome that the consumer surplus is maximized where the tariff in both markets is the 
same. Using this and the zero profit requirement, together with equation (16) gives the 
result that 
1 2,p p c .
7 The welfare-maximising regulator in this case should impose a 
tariff equal to c in each market and the welfare maximizing point is at Z. Figure 1 shows 
that the zero iso-profit curve as the half circle, center K, which goes through Z. If the 
welfare of consumers in each market is given the same weight, the highest attainable 
consumer iso-welfare function, consistent with non-negative profits, is the quarter 
circle, center A, which is just tangent to the zero-profit curve at Z. This is the optimal 
position in this case. 
 
This section constructed the iso-welfare and iso-profit curves where there is a fixed 
wholesale price, a zero profit constraint and where the consumption weights in each 
retail market are equal. In subsequent sections we consider the imposition of a tariff in 
market 1, leaving the firm able to set an unregulated profit maximising price in market 
2. We also relax a number of the assumptions concerning the parameter values and 
weights.  
 
 
 
                                                          
7 With no discretionary weights (that is, setting all weights to unity) the standard first order conditions 
for maximizing welfare are that: 
0
F F F F
i i T T
iF F F F
i i i i
W S P
p p p p
   
    
   
 
In this equation P is the producer surplus of the wholesale firms. Setting d = 0 implies that the producer 
surplus is zero, so that in this case, this means maximizing conventional welfare with a zero profits 
lower bound is equivalent to maximizing consumer surplus with a zero profits constraint. However, 
here d > 0, changes in output will affect producer surplus. This means that maximizing consumer 
surplus does not typically maximize standard welfare measures, though marginal benefits to 
wholesalers will only occur at the cost of reduced benefits to consumers.  
-15- 
 
5. Model with un-equal consumer weights 
1 2( )  . 
 
Varying the consumer welfare weights across the two retail markets changes the 
optimal outcome if the regulator can set a tariff in both markets. Increasing the weight 
on market 1 shifts the consumer iso-welfare function so that it is tangent to the zero iso-
profit curve along the segment ZE. This is illustrated in Figure 2. The iso-welfare curve 
W1 that passes through point Z is no longer tangent to the zero iso-profit curve. The 
highest (weighted) consumer surplus is now found at point H on the iso-welfare curve 
W2. Increasing the weight on the consumers in market 1 will shift the optimal set of 
tariffs towards E, meaning a lower value for
1p and a higher value for 2p .   
 
The most extreme case is where the welfare of consumers in market two is given zero 
weight by the regulator. In this case, the iso-welfare curves become straight horizontal 
lines, with lower lines producing higher consumer welfare. This would lead to an 
optimal outcome given by point E. The monopoly price is still charged in market 2 but 
the profits generated in that market are wholly used to subsidise the consumers in 
market 1.  
 
The segment ZE in both Figures 1 and 2 might include a range where the tariff in market 
1 is negative. Take, for example, the situation where there are no wholesale cost so that 
c = 0. In this case, all the points on the zero iso-profit line, apart from points A and Z, 
have a negative price tariff in one of the markets. In principle, the existence of negative 
prices is not problematic (although negative output clearly is). Negative prices could 
represent the firm paying subsidies to consumers in one market, rather than charging a 
positive price.8 
 
                                                          
8 Though not an exactly comparable situation, senior citizens travel free on all Scottish buses and 
coaches. For some long journeys this includes also free coffee and snacks. These free refreshments might 
be thought of a negative price to use the public transport. Also some educational establishments will 
provide bursaries, rather than charge fees, for low-income pupils. 
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Figure 2: Maximum iso-welfare function with consumer weights in favour of market 1 
and the zero profit constraint with constant wholesale prices   
 
In this section we have shown that the analysis can accommodate differential weighting 
of consumer welfare. This would, in itself, suggest that within the restricted 
assumptions of this approach an optimal position would be for the regulator to set 
different tariffs in the different markets.   
 
 
6.   A tariff in only one of the two markets, zero profit constraint, constant 
wholesale prices 
 
Up to this point we have essentially outlined a model in which the regulator sets tariffs 
in each of the two retail markets. However, the primary focus of the paper is the analysis 
of situations where, for some reason, the extent to which the separate markets can be 
regulated is restricted and, in particular, the extreme case where tariffs can only be set 
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in one of the two markets. Regulators might face political, ideological or practical 
constraints in imposing tariffs in all segments of the retail market. Our concern, which 
will make up the remainder of the paper, is to quantify the size of the loss in efficiency 
that such a constraint would imply, compared to the outcome where tariffs are optimally 
set in both markets. 
 
The formal problem facing the regulator is to set a tariff in market 1 so as to maximize 
total consumer surplus, subject to the monopolist setting the price in market 2 and being 
subject to a profit constraint. In principle, the price set in market 2 that maximizes the 
firm’s total profits depends on the tariff set in market 1, in the form of the reaction 
function. This constraint is given by equation (13). The regulator’s problem can be 
expressed as finding the tariff to apply in market 1 which: 
(19) 
2 2
1 2
1
( ) ( )
2
TMaxS a p a p
b
       
subject to 
 2 1
4
2( )
ad bc ab d
p p
b d b d
 
 
 
 
and 
0T   
Where d = 0, the profit maximizing price in market 2 is independent of the tariff in 
market 1 and from the discussion in Section 4 equals
2
a c
. Essentially, the reaction 
function is a vertical straight line KE in Figures 1 and 2. Consumer welfare is negatively 
related to the price in market 1, so that welfare is maximized at E. Using equation (17) 
this is where 1
( )(1 2)
2
a c
p
 
 . In the remainder of this section we compare the 
welfare benefits that accrue from imposing a uniform tariff across both markets to a 
tariff applied in only one market.  
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6.1 Model with equal consumer weights of unity 
1 2( 1)   .  
 
Using Pythagoras’s theorem, the iso-welfare function that passes through the point K 
in Figures 1 and 2 that maximizes the monopoly profit has a radius √2f, where f is half 
the distance between the maximum price a and the wholesale price, c, so that: 
(20) 
2
a c
f

  
From equation (12) the associated consumer surplus is therefore
2f
b
. With optimal 
regulation, given the zero profit constraint, tariffs are set at Z. The radius of the iso-
welfare function passing through that point is 2√2f, so that the associated consumer 
surplus is 
24 f
b
. Moving to the optimal regulation improves consumer welfare, as 
measured by the consumer surplus, by a factor of 4. However, if the regulator is 
restricted to setting a tariff in only one market, how does this affect the resulting 
welfare?  
 
With only one tariff in operation, consumer welfare is optimized at point E, and with 
equal consumer weights in each market the radius of the iso-welfare function that goes 
through this point is given as: 
(21) 2 2 2 2( 2 ) 2(2 2)R f f f f        
Substituting this result into equation (15) gives a consumers surplus of 
2(2 2) f
b

. 
This value, expressed as a ratio of the optimal welfare is
2 2
0.85
4

 . Alternatively, 
if the changes in welfare, rather than the absolute values, are compared the ratio is  
1 2
0.80
3

 .  Therefore although there is a loss in effectiveness in only being able to 
target one market, the increase in welfare is only reduced by 20% and the consumer 
surplus in the market not receiving the tariff is unchanged. 
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6.2 Model with un-equal consumer weights 
1 2( )   
 
In the case where d = 0, if the regulator can decide which market to target, 20% 
represents the maximum lost potential welfare. Where greater weight is placed on the 
benefits to one set of consumers, this will reduce the resulting loss in effectiveness, as 
against a situation where the same tariff is applied to both sets of consumers.9 Where 
the weights differ markedly, the regulator might prefer imposing a tariff in only one 
market rather than a uniform tariff in both. The analysis can be used to find the relative 
weights that have to be placed on the consumer surplus in the two markets for this to 
occur.10  
 
Where the two markets are weighted unequally, the maximum consumer surplus where 
both tariffs are constrained to take the same value is 2 1 2
2 2
f
b
  
 
 
. Where the tariff 
can only apply in market 1, the maximum consumer surplus is 
2 1 2(3 2 2)
2
f
b
   
 
 
. 
Therefore if the regulator is faced with this choice, the optimal decision would be to 
apply the tariff only in market 1 if: 
1 2 1 2 1
2
(3 2 2) 2 2 3
1.64
2 2 2 1b b
    

  
   

. 
Therefore as long as consumer surplus in market 1 is weighted more than 64% higher 
than in market 2, it is better to place an optimal tariff only in market 1 than have to 
impose equal tariffs in both markets. It is of interest to note that the UK Government 
                                                          
9 Recall that the differential weights do not affect the optimal unified tariffs that should be set in both 
markets or the single tariff set in just one. The differential weights simply change the valuation of the 
resulting outcomes.  
10 It could be the case that other aspects of energy policy could also benefit from segmenting the 
market. For example, emissions from some uses might have a higher negative value than others. This 
segmentation might or might not correspond with affordability. Further, it is negatively linked to the 
quantity of energy used rather than positively related to consumer surplus. Clearly this would 
complicate the analysis and is beyond the scope of this paper. 
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suggests weights for different additions to income across different income quintiles 
(HM Treasury, 2003, Annex 5).11 The average weight for people in the lowest two 
quintiles is 1.65, which is more than double the average value for those in the top three 
quintiles (0.72). Under these weights it would be more efficient to set a tariff in a market 
serving the lowest two quintile of the income distribution as against a uniform tariff 
that applied across the market serving the whole of the population.  
 
In this section we compare the outcome from an optimal uniform tariff across both 
markets and an optimal single tariff imposed in just one. Where consumer welfare 
benefits in one market are weighted more highly than in the other, the single tariff can 
be optimal. However, this is shown for a restricted model where a zero profits constraint 
is imposed and in which the two markets are not directly linked through endogenous 
price changes in the wholesale market. In the subsequent sections we relax these 
assumptions.  
 
7. A tariff in only one of the two markets, positive profit constraint 
 
Up to now we have only constrained profits to be non-negative. However, if fixed costs 
are positive, so that Γ > 0, or if the company has some kind of power with which it can 
push back against the regulator, the profit constraint will be positive. We would expect 
some implicit profit constraint to be determined by bargaining between the regulator 
and the incumbent. If this profit level is set too low, there might be a number of 
consequences. There might be difficulties with financing new investment, attempts to 
evade the requirement to meet the total demand at the regulated price and potential 
bankruptcy if there are unexpected variations in costs or demand. We show that with a 
positive profits constraint, the relative disadvantage of a tariff limited to one market is 
reduced, as is the ratio of the consumer weights required before the single tariff 
becomes the desired option.  
                                                          
11 The midpoint values for weights for net changes in income in the five quintiles, starting from the 
lowest income, are 1.95, 1.35, 0.95, 0.75, and 0.45 respectively (HM Treasury, 2003, p. 94).  
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Figure 3: Maximum iso-welfare function with equal weights and a positive profit 
constraint with constant wholesale prices   
 
The maximum, unregulated, profits, 
MAX , are determined by substituting the value 
1 2,
2
F F a cp p

   into equation (17). This gives the result:  
(22) 
2 22 2
2
MAX
a c f
b b
 
   
 
 
Using equation (22), it is convenient to express the actual profit constraint, T , as a 
proportion,  , of the maximum value, so that:   
(23) 
22
T MAX
f
b

     
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where 1 0  . Substituting this into the expression associated with equation (17) for 
the radius of the iso-profit curve, r, gives the result that12  
(24) 2 22(1 ) 2(1 )r f r f      . 
Therefore if 0   we have the zero profit case where r = √2f, whereas 1  produces 
the profit maximizing case where r = 0. For values of   between 1 and 0, the radius of 
the iso-profit line lies between 0 and √2f. As the profit constraint increases the circular 
iso-profit curve moves closer to the profit-maximising point K. Note that now the profit 
constraint no longer goes through point A (representing prices a,a). Also the point Z 
which minimizes prices in both markets, consistent with the profits constraint and price 
equality, now represents prices greater than c.  
 
We can use equations (15) and (24) to calculate the new maximum welfare where there 
is a positive profit identified by  . The maximum value of R is now 2 2(1 ) f   
. The maximum consumer surplus, where consumption is given an equal weight of unity 
in both markets is:  
(25) 
2
2 22 2(1 ) 2 2 (1 )
2
T
f f
S
b b
         
      where 0
F
TS




.  
Not surprisingly there is a negative relationship between the level of the profit 
constraint and the maximum consumer surplus.  
 
We can similarly calculate the implication of introducing the tariff in only one market 
and imposing the profit constraint. Again if the tariff is imposed in market 1, the output 
in market 2 remains at the monopoly level and the excess profits in that market subsidise 
output in market 1. The maximum consumer surplus (both markets with a unitary 
weight) is now:  
                                                          
12 Recall that the upper-case, R, is the radius of the iso-welfare function and the lower case, r, the 
radius of the iso-profit function. 
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(26) 
2
2
21 1 2(1 ) 2 2 (1 )
2
F
T
f f
S
b b
  
               with again 0
F
TS




.  
Similarly, the ratio, Ω, of the consumer welfare where one tariff is imposed, as against 
a common tariff in both markets, is: 
(27) 
2 2 (1 )
1
2 2 (1 )
 
 
  
  
  
. 
However, 0




, so that this ratio gets higher, and approaches unity as the value of 
 approaches 1. That is to say, the proportionate loss in welfare in an optimal single 
market tariff, as against a common tariff in both markets falls as the profit constraint 
tightens.  
 
Where the profit constraint is positive, there is an increase in welfare where the weights 
for market 1 and 2 are such that:  
(28)
2
2
1
2
2 2
1 2
3 2 2 2 (1 )
2 2
2 2 (1 ) 2 2 (1 )
2 2
f f
b b
f f
b b
   
     
   
   
        
   
 
 which implies  1
2
1 2 (1 )
1 2( 2 1) (1 )
 
  
   
 
    
 
. 
This means that, for example, if  equals 0.5, then if 1
2
1.38


 , then it is better for the 
regulator to impose a tariff solely in market 1, rather than impose a common tariff in 
both markets. Again, given the recommended weights from HM Treasury (2003), any 
tariff that can exclusively target lowest three income quintiles would have a clear 
weighting above 1.4. 
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This section shows that where there is a positive profits constraint, the unweighted 
welfare differences between a uniform and elective tariff are reduced and targeting the 
market with the higher welfare weights is more likely to be the preferred policy.   
 
8. The introduction of a tariff in market 1 where the wholesale price increases 
with output (d > 0) 
 
Sections 6 and 7 analyse pure cross subsidisation, where the positive profits made in 
the unregulated retail market 2 are used to subsidise consumers in the regulated market 
1. Whilst market 2 consumers receive no benefit from the regulation, neither do they 
experience any detrimental impact. However, in this section, where we introduce a 
positively sloping wholesale supply curve, the analysis becomes more complex because 
the two markets become inter-related on the cost side. 
 
The adoption of a positive value for the wholesale supply parameter d has a number of 
important implications. Consider the zero iso-profit curve and compare it to the circular 
curve, where d = 0, discussed in detail in Section 4. The iso-profit curve where d > 0 is 
illustrated in Figure 4. 
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Figure 4: The zero profit constraint with increasing wholesale prices  
 
The zero iso-profit curve now comprises the point A (a,a) and the segment of the elipse 
HZJ where 
1 2,p p a . The point Z (z,z), where wholesale cost equals retail price, has 
moved further up the 45 degree line drawn through the origin: that is to say, z > c. The 
unconstrained profit maximizing point, K (k,k), is still at the mid-point between A and 
Z. The zero iso-profit curve is symmetric around the two perpendicular axes that have 
negative and positive 45 degree slopes and pass through the point K. The width on the 
45 degree line through the origin, AZ, is now shorter than the distance along the other 
axis, FG. This is also verified by the fact that the points (z,a) and (a,z) are no longer on 
the zero iso-profit curve, but generate positive profits.  
 
The general slope of the iso-profit curve is given in equation (11). Where the tariffs are 
equal in both markets, the iso-profit curve will have a slope equal to -1. This reflects 
the symmetry in the model. The iso-profit curve is horizontal where 
1 2/dp dp = 0. 
Equation (13) in Section 3 gives the equation for the value of 
2p where this would hold, 
for any specific value of 
1p . As we noted there, this  can be interpreted as a reaction 
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function: it is the price set in the unregulated market 2 that will be the best response to 
the regulator setting a specific tariff, 
1p , in market 1. 
 
In Section 6, we show that in the special case where d = 0, this reaction function reduces 
to 2
2
a c
p

 , a vertical line. But in the general case, where the wholesale price rises as 
total output increases, this reaction function has a negative slope equal to
b d
d

 . This 
is shown as KE in Figure 4 for values of 
1p k . This implies that if the tariff in market 
1 falls by 1 unit, the profit maximizing price in market 2 will increase by 1
d
b d


. 
There is now a clearer trade-off between the prices consumers face in the separate 
markets. A tariff imposed solely in market 1 in a previously unregulated system means 
that the consumer surplus in market 2 now falls as the consumer surplus in market 1 
rises.  
 
Fully differentiating equation (6) with respect to 
1p k  shows the impact of varying 
the tariff in market 1 on total consumer surplus:  
(29) 2 1 1 2 2
1 1 2 1
1
( ) ( )T T T
dS S S dp d
a p a p
dp p p dp b b d
 
   
          
 
where  1 1 2 2
1
0 ( )( ) ( )T
dS
iff b d a p d a p
dp
       
Given that this inequality always holds, by construction, the welfare maximizing 
decision for the regulator is to reduce the tariff in market 1, subject to the profit 
constraint.  
 
Actually the solution for the minimum market tariff where a particular profits constraint 
is imposed is conceptually straightforward but complex in practice, generating terms 
which do not yield easily to intuition. One potential issue is whether the restriction that 
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the price in market 2 cannot rise above the value a acts as a constraint in this case. 
Essentially this is asking the question: can the regulator set a tariff in market 1 such that 
the firm’s profit-maximising response would be to produce zero output in market 2 yet 
still make positive profits?  
 
Using equation (13), the tariff in market 1 at which the profit maximising price in 
market 2 equals a, so that the demand in that market falls to zero, is given by: 
(30) 
1
( )
2
b a c
p a
d

   
From equation (1) this gives an output in market 1 of : 
(31) 
1
( )
2
a c
q
d

  
Substituting (30) and (31) into equations (3) and (5) produces the profits figure: 
2
1 ( ) 0
2
T
a c
d b iff d b
d
 
      
 
 
The condition for positive profits is therefore simply that the absolute slope of the 
supply function be greater than the slope of the demand function. If this expression 
holds, the minimum tariff consistent with non-negative profits in market 1 would be 
where the tariff in market 1 just equals the wholesale price. This implies that: 
(32) 11 1
a p ad bc
p c dq c d
b b d
  
       
 
Therefore, where d b , we can define a tariff range for market 1 where the profit 
maximising output for market 2 is zero. This range is given by:  
 (33) 1
( )
2
b a c ad bc
a p
d b d
 
  

 
If the tariff is set in this range, the firm will only operate in the regulated market.  
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It is interesting to consider the special case where b = d. In this case the zero iso-profit 
is horizontal at E where it cuts the vertical line through A. This implies that the 
minimum price tariff in market 1 consistent with non-negative profits just leads to 
output in market 2 becoming unprofitable. This is illustrated in Figure 5. In this case, 
from equation (13) the line KE has a slope equals – 2. 
 
Figure 5: Maximum iso-welfare function with equal weights and the zero profit 
constraint with increasing wholesale prices and the slope of the retail demand curve 
equal to the slope of the wholesale supply curve.   
 
Using the expressions derived around equation (10) in Section 3, in this case the values 
of z and k are (2a+c)/3 and (5a +c)/6. It is useful to adopt the following notation: 
(34) 
6 3
a c f
g

   
This means that the distances AK, AZ and AE take the values √2g, 2√2g and 3g 
respectively. Where there is no intervention, the outcome is at K and, using equation 
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(15), the consumer surplus is g2/b. Where the tariff is introduced with the same value 
in both markets, the outcome is at z and the consumer surplus equals 4g2/d. As in the 
case where d = 0, introducing the uniform minimum tariff increases consumer surplus 
to 4 times its original value. However, if the minimum tariff is only imposed in one 
market, in this case the consumer surplus is given as 9g2/2b. This gives a higher value 
than either of the other options. Of course, this implies that if the consumer surplus in 
market 1 were given a greater weight than those in market 2, this would furnish an even 
stronger argument for favouring the introduction of a single tariff in only that market. 
 
We know that for d b , then the zero profit outcome means setting price equal to the 
wholesale price in market 1. In that case the consumer surplus, 1TS , is given as:  
(34) 
2
1
2
b a c
S
b d
 
   
 
However, the consumer surplus where the tariff is introduced in both markets 
simultaneously, 2S , equals:  
(35) 
2
2
2
T
a c
S b
b d
 
   
 
For 1 2T TS S , then 
2
b
d  . But where market 2 is reduced to an output of zero, then 
2
b
d b  , so that wherever this occurs, the choice between equal minimum tariffs 
in both markets and concentrating in just one market means that the consumer surplus 
would be maximised by just applying the tariff to one market.13 
 
                                                          
13 This also means that there is a range of values for d given by 
2
b
d b  where a greater consumer 
surplus would be generated, with a zero profit constraint, by setting a tariff in market 1 equal to the 
average wholesale price and a tariff higher than the marginal wholesale cost in the second market, 
rather than a common tariff in both markets. 
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In the section we consider the impact of the wholesale price being positively related to 
total output, implying that the price in one market is affected by the output in the other 
market. This increases the consumer welfare benefit of a tariff in just one market, as 
against a uniform tariff in both.  
 
9.  Conclusions 
 
It is often the case that in regulated markets with a degree of monopoly power price 
controls are imposed in only one segment of the market. Examples in the UK apply in 
the retail electricity, rail transport, education and housing markets. This behaviour is 
typically motivated by redistributive considerations, with the welfare of one set of 
consumers weighted more heavily than others. In the case of the electricity market this 
could be motivated by concerns over affordability. 
 
The decision not to set differential tariffs that cover the whole of the market might 
reflect administrative or presentational considerations. On the administrative side, the 
regulator might lack the information required to set or impose all prices. Concerning 
presentation, the government might simply wish to affirm a continuing general 
commitment to market mechanisms or to avoid responsibility for the potentially higher 
prices that redistributive regulation implies for some segments of the market. In this 
paper we formally analyse this behaviour using a very stylised model in which a 
monopolist serving two separate retail markets is a monopsonist in an otherwise 
competitive wholesale market. The paper focuses on the consumer welfare implications 
of imposing a price tariff in only one market, against having to impose a uniform tariff 
in both markets. 
 
The analytical results suggest that the welfare costs of imposing price constraints in 
only one market are relatively low, and this is especially the case where the benefits to 
the favoured market are weighted more heavily. Where the minimum profit constraint 
is increased, the relative welfare loss from price control only operating in one market 
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is further reduced. Moreover, with a degree of scarcity in the wholesale market we get 
the potential for a counterintuitive result. This is that there are conditions where it is 
better to only control one tariff, rather than impose a uniform tariff in both markets, 
even with neutral consumer welfare weights. 
 
It is important to stress the theoretical nature of this analysis. There are a number of 
issues which need to be addressed if price tariffs are imposed. For example, there are 
practical questions as to whether it is appropriate to use price discrimination to tackle 
affordability problems. In particular, it is necessary to be able to identify, separate and 
properly target the individual markets. Where this targeting is imperfect, some low 
income consumers will be subject to inappropriately high prices.  A second set of 
concerns center around the effect that price controls could have on competition and 
potential new entry. In future research we are particularly interested in analyzing the 
effect of price controls on potential future entry and competition, the impact of 
differential retail market characteristics within the model and the problems raised by 
incomplete or asymmetric information on the part of firms and the regulator.  
  
-32- 
 
References  
Armstrong, M. (2008), Price Discrimination in P. Buccirossi, ed., Handbook of 
Antitrust Economics, pp. 433-467, Cambridge, Massachusetts, MIT Press. 
Braeutigam, R.R., Panzar, J.C., 1993. Effects of the Change from Rate-of-Return to 
Price-Cap Regulation. The American Economic Review, Vol. 83, No. 2, pp. 191-198. 
Brown, D. P., Eckert, A., Eckert, H., 2017. Electricity markets in transition: Market 
distortions associated with retail price controls. The Electricity Journal, Vol. 30, pp. 32-
37. 
Butcher, L. (2017), Rail Fares and Ticketing, Commons Briefing Paper SNO 1904, 
House of Commons Library 
Cowan, S., 2002. Price-cap regulation. Swedish Economic Policy review, Vol. 9, pp.  
Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (2017), Annual Fuel Poverty 
Statistics Report, 2017 (2015 Data), London. 
Dobbs, I.M., 2004. Intertemporal price cap regulation under uncertainty. The Economic 
Journal, 114, pp. 421-440. 
Felder, F.A., 2010, The Practical Equity Implications of Advanced Metering 
Infrastructure. The Electricity Journal, Vol. 23, No. 6, pp. 56-64. 
HM Treasury, 2003. The Green Book: Appraisal and Evaluation in Central 
Government. Treasury Guidance, London, TSO. 
Hviid, M., Waddams Price, C., 2012. Non-Discrimination clauses in the retail energy 
sector. The Economic Journal, Vol. 122, pp. F236-F252. 
Joskow, P., 2005. Regulation and Deregulation after 25 Years: Lessons Learned for 
Research in Industrial Organisation. Review of Industrial Organization, Vol. 26, pp. 
169-193. 
Joskow, P., Tirole, J., 2000. Transmission Rights and Market Power on Electric 
Power Networks. The RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 31, No. 3, pp. 450-487. 
Joskow, P., Tirole, J., 2006. Retail electricity competition. The RAND Journal of 
Economics, Vol. 37, No. 4, pp. 799-815.Kang, J., Weisman, D.L., Zhang, M., 2000. 
Do consumers benefit from tighter price cap regulation?. Economic Letters, Vol. 67, 
pp. 113-119. 
-33- 
 
Kennedy, P. W., 1994. Equilibrium Pollution Taxes in Open Economies with 
Imperfect Competition. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Vol. 
27, pp. 49-63. 
Littlechild, S., 2014. Promoting or restricting competition?: Regulation of the UK 
residential energy market since 2008. EPRG Working Paper 1415, Cambridge 
Working Paper in Economics. Available at: http://www.eprg.group.cam.ac.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2014/09/1415-PDF.pdf  
Littlechild, S., 2016. The CMA energy market investigation, the well-functioning 
market, Ofgem, Government and behavioural economics. Available at: 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/56b9d951e5274a0369000015/Mr_Step
hen_Littlechild_submission_February_2016.pdf  
Littlechild, S., 2017. Competition and Price Controls in the UK Retail Energy Market. 
Network, Issue 63, A publication of the Australian Competition and Consumer 
Commission for the Utility Regulators Forum. Available at: 
https://www.accc.gov.au/system/files/network%20june%202017%20%28D2017-
00045379%29.pdf  
Ofgem, 2016. Retail Energy Markets in 2016. Published 3 August 2016. Available at: 
https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/system/files/docs/2016/08/retail_energy_markets_in_2016
.pdf  
Ofgem, 2017. Prepayment price cap: 1 October 2017 to 31 March 2018. Published 7th 
August 2017. Available at: https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/publications-and-
updates/prepayment-price-cap-1-october-2017-31-march-2018  
Parker, D., 1997. Price cap regulation, profitability and returns to investors in the UK 
regulated industries. Utilities Policy, Vol. 6, No. 4, pp. 303-315. 
Scottish Government (2015), Scotland’s Economic Strategy, March 2015, Scottish 
Government, Edinburgh. 
Simshauser, P., 2014. When Does Electricity Price Cap regulation Become 
Distortionary?. The Australian Economic Review, Vol. 47, No. 3, pp. 304-323. 
-34- 
 
Simshauser, P., Nelson, T. 2014. The Consequences of Retail Electricity Price Rises: 
Rethinking Customer Hardship. The Australian Economic review, Vol. 47, No. 1, pp. 
13-43 
Simshauser, P., Whish-Wilson, P., 2017. Price discrimination in Australia’s retail 
electricity markets: An Analysis of Victoria & Southeast Queensland. Energy 
Economics, Vol. 62, pp. 92-103. 
Stole, L. (2007), Price Discrimination and Competition in M. Armstrong and R. 
Porter, eds., Handbook of Industrial Economics, vol. III, pp. 221-299, Amsterdam, 
Elsevier. 
Ulph, A., 1996. Environmental policy and International trade when Governments and 
Producers Act Strategically. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 
Vol. 30, pp. 265-281. 
Waddams Price, C., 2005. The Effect of Liberalizing UK Retail Energy Markets on 
Consumers. Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Vol. 21, No. 1, pp. 128-144. 
 
  
-35- 
 
Appendix A: Unconstrained profit maximisation 
Using the first order conditions, in the case with no regulation, the unconstrained profit-
maximizing outputs in markets one and two are given as: 
(A1)    
1,2
2( 2 )
U
i
a c
q i
b d

 
  
These quantities are positive as long as production is financially viable at all (that is as 
long as a > c). The corresponding prices in the individual markets can be obtained from 
substituting equation (A1) into equation (1) in the text. This gives: 
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In the specific unconstrained case, substituting equations (3), (A1) and (A2) into 
equation (5) produces, with some manipulation: 
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In the short run, production is profitable as long as a > c. In the long run, revenue needs 
to be enough to cover the fixed costs, Γ, in order that non-negative profits can be made. 
Each market makes half of the revenue, so that the short-run profits made in each 
market, Ui , can be identified as: 
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This gives the current profit in each market but does not allocate the fixed costs across 
markets. 
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If the market demand parameters are allowed to differ, equation (1) in the text becomes:  
(A5)   
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To illustrate the implications, we taking the most straightforward case where the 
consumption weights are equal and the wholesale price does not vary with scale, so that
1 2 1    and 0d  . Fixing the consumers’ welfare at a positive level, TS , produces 
the iso-welfare function for the tariff values 
1 1 2 2,p a p a  as:  
(A6) 
2 2
1 1 2 2
1 2
1 1
( ) ( )
2 2
TS a p a p
b b
     
where: 
( )
0i iT
i i
a pS
p b

  

 
 
Each iso-welfare function is here the segment of an elipse which is centred at the point 
1 2( , )a a in 1 2,p p  space. Consumer welfare is minimized, that is takes a zero value, 
where 1 1 2 2,p a p a  . In general the slope of the iso-consumer’s welfare function is 
given as: 
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All the iso-welfare functions are vertical where 1 1p a and horizontal where 2 2p a . 
They have the general form of the weighted iso-welfare functions identified by equation 
(6) in the text.    
 
Total profits are given as: 
 (A8) 
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This implies that 
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(A9) 
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Again for a given profit level, T , equation (A8) can be used to define the 
corresponding iso-profit function as:  
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The slope of the iso-profit curve, is given as: 
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The iso-profit curve is horizontal and vertical where 22
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respectively. The iso-profit curve is therefore an elipse whose center is 1 2,
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in 1 2,p p  space.  
The subsequent diagrammatic analysis follows that in the text but clearly the 
implications and interpretation of the impact of changes in these parameter values 
requires extended and more detailed investigation. 
 
